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Recent Developments

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine:
Federal Boat Safety Act Does Not Preempt State Common Law Tort Claims

By: Carl Zacarias
~e

United States Supreme
.1 Court held the Federal
Boat Safety Act (FBSA) does not
preempt state common-law tort
claims. Spreitsma v. Mercury
Marine, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 518
(2002). Specifically, the Court held
neither the express preemption
clause of the FBSA, the Coast
Guard's decision not to adopt a
regulation, or any other implicit
preemption within the FBSA
preempted state common-law tort
claims arising out offailure to install
propeller guards on boat engines.
Id. at 529. In so holding, the Court
stated the most natural reading of
the FSBA saving clause, read in
conjunction with the preemption
clause, indicates the Act was
intended to preempt performance
standards and equipment
requirements imposed by positive
state enactments. Id.
Sprietsma was killed in a
boating accident when the propeller
of an outboard motor struck her. In
a common law tort action in Illinois
state court, her estate claimed the
Mercury motor that struck her was
unreasonably dangerous because it
had no propeller guard. The trial
court found the action expressly
preempted by the FSBA, and
dismissed the complaint. The lllinois
Supreme Court rejected the
expressed preemption rationale, but

affirmed on implied preemption
grounds. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari
on the issue of whether a state
common-law tort action seeking
damages from the manufacturer of
an outboard motor is preempted by
either the FBSA, or the decision of
the Coast Guard not to promulgate
a regulation requiring propeller
guards on motor boats.
Before examining the theories
of preemption asserted by Mercury,
the Court reviewed the history of
federal regulation of boat safety.
Spreitsma, 123 S.Ct. at 524. The
Court observed Congress enacted
the FBSA to improve the safety of
recreation boats. Id. at 524-25.
The Congressional purpose behind
the FBSA is "to improve boating
safety," to authorize "the establishment ofnational construction and
performance standards for boats
and associated equipment" and to
encourage greater "uniformity of
boating laws and regulations as
among the several States and the
Federal Government." Id.
The Court next reviewed the
authority of the Coast Guard to
issue regulations establishing
"minimum safety standards for
recreational vessels and associated
equipment," and requiring the
installation or use of such equipment. Sprietsma, 123 S.Ct. at 525.

In particular, the Court pointed out
the power of the Coast Guard to
issue exemptions from its regulations if it determined that boating
safety "will not be adversely
affected." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. §
4305 (1997)).
As a primer to its analysis, the
Court set forth the preemption and
savings clauses in question, and the
facts behind the Coast Guard's
consideration of propeller guard
regulation. Sprietsma, 123 S.Ct.
at 525-26. The preemption clause
states that a State "may not
establish, continue in effect, or
enforce a law or regulation
establishing a recreational vessel or
associated equipment performance
or other safety standard or
imposing a requirement for
associated equipment that is not
identical to a regulation prescribed
under Section 4302 ofthis title." Id.
(citing 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g).) The
saving clause states that
"[c]ompliance with this chapter or
standards, regulations, or orders
prescribed under this chapter does
not relieve a person from liability
at common law or under State law."
Id.
As for the Coast Guard
inaction, in 1990 the Coast Guard
concluded, after extensive study,
the available accident data did not
support the adoption of a regulation
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requiring propeller guards on
motors. Id. However, the Coast
Guard stated it would continue to
review information "regarding
development and testing of new
propeller guard devices or other
information on the state of the art."
Id. at 526.
The Court began its analysis by
treating the issue of expressed
preemption fIrst. Id at 526-27. The
Court held the language of the
preemption clause is the most
naturally read as not encompassing
common-law claims for two
reasons. Id. First the Court
observed the article 'a' before 'law
and regulation' implies statutes, not
common law. Id Second, the
terms "law" and "regulation" used
together in the preemption clause
indicate that Congress preempted
only positive enactments by states.
Id. The FBSA's saving clause
buttresses this conclusion because
it "assumes that there are some significant number of common law
liability cases to save and the language of the preemption provision
permits a narrow reading that
excludes common law actions." Id
The Court further stated that
the contrast between its general
reference to liability at common law
and the more specific clause
indicates it was drafted to preempt
performance standards and equipment requirements imposed by
statute or regulation. Id The Court
noted the rationale for Congress not
to preempt common-law claims,
which necessarily perform an
important remedial role in compensating accident victims. Id
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On the issue of implied
preemption, the Court began by
stating the general rule on the issue.
Sprietsma, 123 S.Ct. at 527-28.
Implied preemption is found where
it is impossible for a private party
to comply with both state and
federal requirements, or where state
law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. Id With that rule in
mind, the Court rejected Mercury's
argument the Coast Guard's
decision not to adopt a regulation
requiring propeller guards on motor
boats is the functional equivalent of
a regulation prohibiting all states and
their political subdivisions from
adopting such a regulation. Id.
The Court did recognize a
federal decision to forgo regulation
in a given area may imply an
authoritative federal determination
that the area is best left unregulated.
Id at 528. The absence of federal
regulation has as much preemptive
force as a decision to regulate, but
that was not the case here. Id The
Court found the stated reasons the
Coast Guard gave for not issuing a
regulation did not clearly indicate an
intent or purpose to leave the area
of propeller guards unregulated. Id
Finally, the Court rejected the
idea that the statutory scheme of the
FBSA implicitly preempted state
common-law tort action. Sprietsma, 123 S.Ct. at 529. The Court
held the FBSA did not so completely occupy the field of safety
regulation of recreational boats as
to foreclose state common-law
remedies. Id.
The Court

compared this case with Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 98 S.Ct. 988 (1978), which
held for fIeld-preemption rules to
apply there must be a "fIeld reserved
for federal regulation" and that
"Congress had left no room for state
regulation ofthese matters." Id The
FSBA's structure and framework do
not convey a clear and manifest
intent to preempt all state common
law relating to boat manufacture. Id
In conclusion, the Supreme
Court's holding in Spriestma
greatly affects many Maryland
lawyers practicing in the areas of
products liability and maritime law.
Remedies in Maryland tort law are
now available in boat safety cases.
To the further advantage of
plaintiff's lawyers, the FSBA
standards and regulations can be
used to provide proof of negligence
while still permitting large damage
awards in state common law.

